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IN RE E.G., A MINOR*: DEATH OVER LIFE: A
JUDICIAL TREND CONTINUES AS THE ILLINOIS
SUPREME COURT GRANTS MINORS THE RIGHT
TO REFUSE LIFE-SAVING MEDICAL
TREATMENT
"To be or not to be."' That may be the question, but the answer as to who shall live and who shall die is far from resolved.
When William Shakespeare penned these famous words in 1599,2 it
is doubtful that he envisioned this debate taking legal ramifications,
much less in the highest courts of a distant nation. But this simple
phrase is now at the heart of an important judicial struggle in
America,' the State of Illinois being no exception. In In re E.G., a
Minor," the Illinois Supreme Court examined for the first time5
* In re E.G., a Minor, 133 Ill. 2d 98, 549 N.E.2d 322 (1989).
1. Shakespeare, HAMLET, ACT III, Scene i.
2. G. Evans, THE RIVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE 1136 (1974).
3. The landmark case concerning the right to refuse medical treatment is In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). This case
involved Karen Anne Quinlan who, after suffering severe brain damage, was diagnosed as being terminally ill and in a chronic vegetative state. Id. at 24, 355 A.2d at
654. Karen's father sought to have the respirator and feeding tube, which were keeping Karen alive, disconnected, thinking that his daughter would die quickly thereafter. Id. at 22, 355 A.2d at 651. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the right of
privacy is broad enough to allow a patient to refuse medical treatment in certain
instances. Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
However, there is a difference between asserting a right to die, as in Quinlan, and
refusing life-saving medical treatment, as in In re E.G. In the latter case, death is not
usually a desired outcome, but rather a consequence.
The leading case in Illinois on the refusal of life-saving medical treatment is In re
Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill.
2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965). In Brooks, the Illinois Supreme Court held that an adult has the right to refuse life-saving blood transfusions
on the basis of the free exercise clause of the first amendment. Id. at 372-73, 205
N.E.2d at 442.
4. 133 Ill.
2d 98, 549 N.E.2d 322 (1989).
5. Id. at 112, 549 N.E.2d at 328. This issue is almost one of first impression in
the entire country. The only other case which has examined whether a minor has the
right to refuse life-saving medical treatment is In re D.P., No. 91950, slip op. (Santa
Clara County) (Juv. Ct. July 3, 1986).
In re D.P. involved a fourteen year old girl suffering from cancer who was also a
Jehovah's Witness. Unlike Ernestine, she refused to take blood transfusions, even if
court ordered, and said she would leave the hospital before taking any transfusions.
Brief for Petitioner at 37, In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d 98, 549 N.E.2d 322 (1989). The D.P.
court did not order transfusions because the girl could not be kept in the hospital
against her will. Id. Ernestine, on the other hand, was willing to accept court ordered
transfusions, since this would be done through no fault of her own and would not
affect her religious standing. See infra note 19 for a discussion of disfellowship from
the Jehovah's witness faith.
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whether a mature6 minor has the right to refuse life-saving medical
treatment.7 The court resolved this issue in favor of the minor E.G.,
holding that .a mature minor has a common law right to consent to,
or refuse, medical treatment.' By so ruling, the court found that this
common law right outweighs any state interest in preserving life,
protecting the interests of third parties, preventing suicide, and
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession.'
On February 23, 1987, Ernestine Gregory ("Ernestine"), a 17
year old girl,10 was admitted to Little Company of Mary Hospital
and was diagnosed as having acute nonlymphatic leukemia." At6. See infra note 26 for the text of the Emancipation of Mature Minors Act,
which is the controlling law in Illinois used to determine maturity.
7. A slightly different issue is raised when parents refuse to consent to medical
treatment on behalf of their children because of religious beliefs. When parents' religious beliefs interfere with a minor's right to live, the religious beliefs must give way
to the preservation of life. See generally AM. JUR. 2D NEW Topic SERVICE, Right to
Die: Wrongful Life § 21 (1979).
Many courts have held that parents may not withhold life-saving medical treatment from their children because of religious beliefs. See Application of the President
and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (court ordered
blood transfusions, despite patient's religious beliefs, where patient wanted to live
and transfusions were necessary to save her life), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964);
Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital, 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967)
(Washington statutes allowed judge to declare children dependents for purpose of
authorizing blood transfusions against parents' wishes), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968);
People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952) (court ordered
life-saving blood transfusions for infant child despite parents' opposition); In re Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978) (court ordered chemotherapy
for minor leukemia patient over parents' objections); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d
97 (Mo. App. 1952) (state had power to take custody of infant child with anemia
where father refused to permit transfusions because of religious beliefs); Raleigh
Fitkin-Paul Morgan Hospital v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (blood transfusion authorized for nonconsenting Jehovah's Witness who was pregnant), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962) (court
declared parents guilty of neglect for refusing, on religious grounds, to consent to
son's needed blood transfusions, and guardian appointed for the sole purpose of consenting to transfusions), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d
699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (court ordered surgery for infant spina bifida
patient over parents' objections); In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641
(1970) (fifteen year old boy held neglected after mother refused to consent to blood
transfusions during surgery on the boy for facial deformity), aff'd, 37 App. Div. 2d
668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686, 278 N.E.2d 918
(1972); Matter of Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425 (Tenn. App. 1983) (where twelve year old
girl dying of cancer needed blood transfusions, court held that preservation of life
outweighed parents' religious beliefs).
8. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 112, 549 N.E.2d at 328.
9. Id. at 111, 549 N.E.2d at 328.
10. Ernestine was actually seventeen years, six months old at the time of trial.
Id. at 104, 549 N.E.2d at 324.
11. Leukemia is a continuous, malignant disease of the blood, characterized by
distorted development of the white blood cells and bone marrow, which eventually

causes death.

DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY

914 (27th ed. 1988). Pa-

tients who suffer from acute nonlymphatic leukemia have chromosomal abnormalities
in their white blood cells. Id.
There is no known cure for either the acute or chronic forms of leukemia, but the
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tending physicians informed Ernestine and her mother, Rosie
Denton, that blood transfusions were necessary in order to treat the
disease." However, Ernestine and her mother refused to consent to
such treatment because of their religious beliefs. 3 As Jehovah's Witnesses,1 4 they believe receiving blood transfusions 5 violates the Bible's prohibition against the consumption of blood.'"
As a result of their refusal to consent to the blood transfusions,
the Illinois State's Attorney's Office filed a petition in juvenile
court. 7 In this petition, the State's Attorney sought both the finding
that Ernestine was medically neglected, and the appointment of a
temporary guardian to consent to the transfusions.' At an April 8,
disease can be controlled by bone-marrow transplants and chemotherapy. Blood
transfusions help control the disease after chemotherapy treatments. BLACK'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY

408 (35th ed. 1987). The cause of leukemia has not been discovered.

Id. at 409.
12. In re E.G., at 101-02, 549 N.E.2d at 323.
13. Id.
14. Since 1876, Jehovah's Witnesses have believed that they are living in the
"last days," which will culminate in the Battle of Armageddon when Christ will re-

turn to set up his earthly kingdom. J. PENTON, APOCALYPSE DELAYED: THE STORY OF
17 (1985). Witnesses abstain from voting, running for public

JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES

office, serving in the military, recognizing the national anthem, or honoring the American flag. Whalen, Don't Get Unhinged By Doorbell Evangelists, CHRISTIANITY ToDAY, March 2, 1984 at 36. Jehovah's Witnesses search for scripture that supports their
beliefs while ignoring Biblical text that does not. By doing so, they attempt to show
that owning a Christmas tree is sinful, and that only a Biblical elite of 144,000 followers will enter Heaven (this interpretation of Revelation 7:1-8, describes 144,000 Jews
witnessing on earth for Christ during the Tribulation). Id. at 38. They also believe
that blood transfusions are prohibited by God. Id.
Jehovah's Witnesses typically refuse blood transfusions based on what they believe to be the Bible's prohibition against "eating blood." J. Ford, Refusal of Blood

Transfusions By Jehovah's Witnesses, 10

CATHOLIC LAWYER

212 (1964). Witnesses

believe that taking blood transfusions is contrary to the teachings of Genesis 9:4,
Leviticus 3:17, and Acts 15:29. J. PENTON, supra at 153. Genesis 9:4 states: "But flesh
with the life thereof, which is the blood thereof, shall ye not eat." Leviticus 3:17
states: "By a perpetual law for your generation, and all your habitations, neither
blood nor fat shall you eat at all." Acts 15:29 reads: "That you abstain from things
sacrificed to idols, and blood."
Jehovah's Witnesses reject the argument that these passages are dietary laws.
Witnesses believe that since a blood transfusion is intravenous feeding, it is identical
to eating blood. J. Ford, supra at 212. In contrast, based on the history and teaching
of Christianity, the Catholic Church believes that "eating blood" (blood from animal
meat) is no longer a violation of God's law. Id. at 213.
15. Mrs. Denton consented to any other treatment for Ernestine besides blood
transfusions and signed a waiver releasing all medical staff from liability for not administering the transfusions. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 102, 549 N.E.2d at 323.
16. Id. For Bible passages allegedly supporting Jehovah's Witnesses' prohibition
against blood transfusions, see supra note 14.
17. Ernestine's attending physicians initially contacted the State's Attorney. In
re E.G., 161 Ill. App. 3d at 765, 766, 515 N.E.2d 286, 287 (1st Dist. 1987).
18. The court held a custody hearing on February 25, 1987 to determine
whether a temporary guardian should be appointed. Id. The State presented Dr.
Stanley Yachnin, a hematology expert who had examined Ernestine the day after she
was admitted. Id. He testified that Ernestine's platelet count was 30,000 at the time
of her admission, far lower than her normal count of 200,000 to 300,000. Brief for
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1987 hearing, several witnesses testified, including Ernestine, who
had already received several court ordered transfusions.'" The trial
court took the urgency of Ernestine's condition into account and
found that Rosie Denton had medically neglected her daughter. As a
result, the court appointed a temporary guardian to consent to all
medical treatment Ernestine required."0
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court in part,
holding that Ernestine was a "mature minor" and could therefore
refuse the blood transfusions based on her first amendment right to
22
freely exercise her religion. 21 Relying on In re Estate of Brooks,

Petitioner at 10, In re E.G., a Minor, 133 Il. 2d at 298, 549 N.E.2d at 322. He stated
that without transfusions she would likely die within two weeks and he would be
"astonished" if she lived a month. Id. Dr. Yachnin also stated that when transfusions
are coupled with chemotherapy, the disease achieves remission 80% of the time. In re
E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 102, 549 N.E.2d at 323. However, leukemia patients have a survival rate of only twenty to twenty-five percent. Id.
19. In re E.G., 161 Ill. App. 3d at 767, 515 N.E.2d at 288. A Jehovah's Witness
would be excommunicated from the faith and consumed at the Battle of Armageddon
if she knowingly received a blood transfusion. Brief for Petitioner at 14, In re E.G.,
133 Il. 2d 98, 549 N.E.2d 322 (1989). However, if the court forced her to take blood
transfusions against her will, Ernestine stated that she would not risk disfellowship.
Id. See also Woodward, Are They False Witnesses?, NEWSWEEK, July 20, 1981, at 75
(one percent of Jehovah's Witness members excommunicated 6ach year). Ernestine
would still be resurrected by Jehovah and not be destroyed at Armageddon. In earth's
final battle, which will be so destructive that "except those days be shortened, no
flesh would be saved" Matthew 24:21, Christ will return to destroy his enemies and
set up his millennial kingdom. Revelation 19:17-21. "Armageddon" refers to the Valley of Megiddo, a 25 mile long valley in north eastern Israel. See supra note 14 for a
discussion of Jehovah's Witnesses' religious beliefs.
After receiving ten blood transfusions, Ernestine was confident she would still go
to Heaven because the decision to administer the transfusions had been made by the
court, not her. Brief for Petitioner at 14, In re E.G., a Minor, 133 II1. 2d 98, 549
N.E.2d 322 (1989). It would be the judge's sin, not Ernestine's. Id. at 16.
Compare Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75 N.Y.2d 218, 551 N.E.2d 77 (1990) (expectant
mother with leukemia refused blood transfusions not only for religious reasons, but
also to avoid the risk of AIDS). For a general discussion of the risk of contracting
AIDS through blood transfusions, see Minamoto, Infection With Human T-Cell Leukemia Virus Type I in Patients With Leukemia, 318 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 219 (1988).
See also Shafer, Adverse Affects of Transfusions, 69 So. MED. J. 476 (1976) (between
3,000 and 30,000 people die each year in the United States as a result of blood
transfusions).
20. In re E.G., 161 Ill. App. 3d at 767, 515 N.E.2d at 287-88. At the conclusion
of this hearing, the court appointed Jane McAtee, counsel for the University of Chicago Hospital, Ernestine's temporary guardian, and authorized her to consent to
transfusions on Ernestine's behalf. In re E.G., 133 IlI. 2d at 102, 549 N.E.2d at 32324.
21. In re E.G., 161 Ill. App. 3d at 771-72, 515 N.E.2d at 290-91. The trial court
found that Ernestine had made a mature decision to follow her religious beliefs, not
that she herself was mature. Id.
While there is a constitutional right to religious belief, the law can limit religious
practices. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878). In this famous Mormon
polygamy case, the court stated: "Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a
necessary part of religious worship. [W]ould it be seriously contended that the civil
government ... could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice." Id. Similarly, the state can
make the handling of poisonous snakes illegal even if such activity is required for
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the appellate court first noted that an adult Jehovah's Witness has a
constitutional right to refuse blood transfusions 2 3 The appellate
court then extended this holding to include "mature minors," drawing this conclusion from cases" ' in which the United States Supreme
Court has allowed "mature minors" to consent to abortions without
parental approval.2 5 Recognizing that Ernestine was only six months
from her eighteenth birthday at the time of trial and relying on the
Emancipation of Minors Act,2" the court concluded that Ernestine
was partially emancipated and, therefore, had the right to refuse
transfusions." Specifically, the appellate court held that a mature
minor has a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment. 8
The Illinois Supreme Court granted the State's petition for
leave to appeal to decide the issue of whether a mature minor has a
right to refuse medical treatment. 9 The court declined to address
the first amendment question, finding that the issue could be rereligious worship. See generally Annotation, Power of Courts or Other Public Agencies, In the Absence of Statutory Authority, to Order Compulsory Medical Care For
Adults, 9 A.L.R.3d 1393 (1966) (citing Hill v. State, 38 Ala. App. 404, 88 So.2d 880,
cert. denied, 264 Ala. 197, 88 So.2d 887 (1956)) (State outlawed the handling of poisonous snakes during religious ceremonies).
22. 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965). See supra note 3 for the Brooks
holding.
23. In re E.G., 161 Ill. App. 3d at 772, 515 N.E.2d at 291.
24. Id. at 770, 515 N.E.2d at 290, (citing Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (state may not restrain a minor's right to abortion by requiring her to obtain parental consent)); Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622
(1979) (Massachusetts statute preventing minor from receiving an abortion without
both parents' consent held unconstitutional)
25. In re E.G., 161 Ill. App. 3d at 771, 515 N.E.2d at 290. Although recognizing
that the Supreme Court has not extended a minor's constitutional right of privacy
beyond abortion, the appellate court found such extension "inevitable." Id. But see
In re E.G., 133 Ill.
2d 98, 108, 549 N.E.2d 322, 326 (1989), where the majority felt that
extending the constitutional mature minor doctrine to cases involving refusal of medial treatment was not "inevitable."
26. Emancipation of Mature Minors Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2201
(1989). See infra note 97 for a discussion of this Act.
27. In re E.G., 161 Ill.
App. 3d at 771, 515 N.E.2d at 290-91.
28. Id.
29. In re E.G., 133 Ill.
2d 98, 104-05, 549 N.E.2d 322, 324 (1989). The court also
considered two other issues of lesser importance. Id. First, whether the appeal should
be dismissed as moot, since Ernestine was no longer a minor (she turned eighteen on
November 25, 1987). Id. at 105, 549 N.E.2d at 325. Second, whether the trial court's
finding of neglect against Mrs. Denton should be upheld. Id. Concerning the mootness issue, the general rule is that a court will dismiss an appeal where substantial
questions raised during trial no longer exist. People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411
Ill. 618, 622, 104 N.E.2d 769, 772, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952). However, when
an issue of substantial public interest is presented, an exception to the mootness doctrine exists. Id. To determine whether there is sufficient public interest, the reviewing
court looks to the public or private nature of the issue, the need to decide the issue
for further guidance, and the likelihood that the matter will recur in the future. Id.
The court found that the issue of whether a minor can refuse medical treatment met
the criteria of this public interest exception, and decided to hear the case. In re E.G.,
133 Ill. 2d 105-06, 549 N.E.2d 322, 325 (1989). The court also reversed the finding of
neglect against Mrs. Denton. Id. at 112-13, 549 N.E.2d at 328.
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solved on other grounds.30 Lacking guidance from the United States
Supreme Court, which has never held that a constitutionally based
right to refuse medical treatment exists for adults3 or minors, the
court relied on Illinois common law to resolve this issue. 32 The
court's majority reasoned that eighteen is not an automatic age restriction limiting the rights of mature minors, whether the rights are
derived from the constitution or the common law.3 3 The Illinois Supreme Court relied on decisions in which a minor's common law
right to refuse medical treatment has been established.3 4 The court
then concluded that with judicial approval, a minor can refuse medical treatment, even if this refusal results in the minor's death.35
The Illinois Supreme Court began its analysis by recognizing
that in Illinois, an adult has a common law right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment,3 6 including blood transfusions.3 7 However, the United States Supreme Court has not recognized that
adults or minors have a constitutional right to refuse life-saving
medical treatment.3 ' Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court relied on
both case law and Illinois statutes to support its conclusion that
eighteen is not a strictly adhered to age restriction limiting the
rights of mature minors.3 9 Relying upon the Consent by Minors to
Medical Operations Act 4" and the Emancipation of Mature Minors
30. Id. at 112, 549 N.E.2d at 328.
31. The United States Supreme Court will soon address the issue of whether
the right to privacy includes decisions to withdraw life-prolonging medical treatment
from an incompetent adult. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc),
cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
The right to privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. However,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) held that a constitutional right of privacy exists, emanating from penumbras in the first amendment. Id. at 484. Privacy
encompasses only fundamental rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973), or those which are "deeply rooted in the
Nation's history," Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 156, 192 (1986) (quoting Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). The Supreme Court has never held
that the right of privacy includes the right to refuse life-saving medical treatment.
32. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d 98, 106-07, 549 N.E.2d 322, 325-26 (1989).
33. Id. at 107-08, 549 N.E.2d at 326.
34. Id. at 106, 549 N.E.2d at 326.
35. Id. at 111, 549 N.E.2d at 328.
36. Id. at 109 (citing In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 45-46, 549 N.E.2d
292, 297-98 (1989)).
37. See Brooks, supra note 3 and accompanying text (an adult has a common
law right to refuse medical treatment, even if it results in his death). In re Osborne,
294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972) (court would not appoint guardian for adult who refused
blood transfusions on religious grounds).
38. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
39. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d 98, 106, 549 N.E.2d 322, 325 (1989).
40. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 4501 (1989). The Consent By Minors to Medical Operations Act states:
The consent to the performance of a medical or surgical procedure by a physician licensed to practice medicine and surgery executed by a married person
who is a minor, or by any person 18 years of age or older, is not voidable because of such minority, and, for such purpose, a married person who is a minor,
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Act, 1 the court found that minors possess numerous rights usually
associated with adulthood.' 2 For example, the court drew analogy
from criminal law, citing the Juvenile Court Act,"3 which allows minors to be tried as adults if they possess certain mental states."
When a minor is mature enough to form criminal intent, both the
common law and the Juvenile Court Act treat the minor as an
adult."
Moreover, the court acknowledged that minors are treated as
adults under constitutional law.' Minor's constitutionally protected
rights include: the right of privacy; 7 freedom of expression;' freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures;' 9 and procedural due
process."
Next, the court stated that in addition to these constitutional
rights, mature minors have common law rights regarding consent to
medical treatment." In support, the court interpreted the decision
of In re Estate of Longeway 52 as extending the absolute right of
control over one's body to mature minors.5 3 The In re E.G. court
a pregnant woman who is a minor, or any person 18 years of age or older, is
deemed to have the same legal capacity to act and has the same powers and
obligations as has a person of legal age.
Id.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2201 (1987).
42. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d 98, 105, 549 N.E.2d 322, 325 (1989).
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 805-4 (1987).
44. The court construed the Juvenile Court Act, supra note 43, as finding that
in certain situations, minors can be found mature enough to have formulated mens
rea in committing crimes. In re E.G., 133 Ill.
2d at 107, 549 N.E.2d at 326.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 108, 549 N.E.2d at 326.
47. Id. (citing Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)). A blanket prohibition of the distribution of contraceptives to minors is unconstitutional.
Carey, 431 U.S. at 694.
48. In re E.G., 133 11. 2d at 108, 549 N.E.2d at 326 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)). High school students
wearing black arm bands to protest United State's policy in Vietnam protected by the
first amendment.
49. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 108, 549 N.E.2d at 336, (citing New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)). School officials are not exempt from the first amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures just because they have
authority over schoolchildren. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325.
50. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 108, 549 N.E.2d at 326, (citing In re Application of
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)). Due process requires that adequate and timely notice be
given to a child and his parents or guardian. Gault, 387 U.S. at 33. "Constitutional
rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the statedefined age of majority." Planned Parenthoodof Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
74 (1976).
51. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 109-10, 549 N.E.2d 326-27.
52. In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d at 292 (1989).
53. In re E.G., 133 Ill 2d at 109, 549 N.E.2d at 326. Justice Cardozo stated that
every adult has the right to decide what will be done with his own body, and any
doctor who operates without patient consent may be liable for assault. Longeway, 133
Ill. 2d at 44, 549 N.E.2d at 297 (citing Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,
211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)). For a discussion of patient consent, see
41.
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distinguished cases which have ordered medical treatment for minors on the basis that the issue in those cases was not whether a
minor could refuse treatment, but whether a parent could do so on
behalf of their child. 4
The court held that because of the State's parens patriae power
to protect a minor's health,"' and the fact that Illinois has a strong
public policy favoring life, 6 a mature minor must have judicial approval to refuse medical treatment. 57 When a minor's health and life
are at stake, courts afford strong consideration to this policy favoring life. 5 Thus, in determining whether a minor is mature enough to
refuse life-saving medical treatment, the trial judge must weigh evidence 9 of the minor's maturity against these two principles favoring
life and health.60 If the evidence is clear and convincing that the
minor is mature enough to understand the consequences of her decision, then the trial court may determine that there is a common law
right to refuse medical treatment."
However, the mature minor's right to refuse medical treatment
is not absolute.62 Courts must balance the minor's right against four
State interests: 3 preserving life, protecting the interests of third
parties, preventing suicide,6 ' and maintaining the ethical integrity of
also Hirsh & Cuneo, Who Shall Live, Who Shall Die, Who Decides? 5 MED. & L. 111,
113 (1986).
The Longeway court reasoned that since a doctor could not treat a patient without his consent, it naturally followed that the patient had a common law right to
refuse medical treatment, whether it be life-saving or life-sustaining. Longeway, 133
Ill. 2d at 45, 549 N.E.2d at 297.
54. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 110, 549 N.E.2d at 327.
55. Id. at 110-11, 549 N.E.2d at 327. As parens patriae,the State has a special
duty to protect minors and, if necessary, submit minors to medical treatment where
their lives are in jeopardy. In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tenn. App. 1983).
56. Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 51, 549 N.E.2d at 300 (citing Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital, 117 Ill. 2d 230, 249, 512 N.E.2d 691, 701 (1987)).
57. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 110, 549 N.E.2d at 327. Because of Illinois' strong
public policy favoring life, judicial intervention is appropriate in cases where a minor's health is involved. Id. A minor, who otherwise has a long life ahead of herself,
could jeopardize that life by making an imprudent decision. Id.
58. Id. at 111, 549 N.E.2d at 327.
59. Id. In Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. App. 1987), a case the
majority relied on, the court looked to age, ability, experience, education, the nature
of the treatment, and the minor's ability to appreciate the risks and consequences of
her actions, to determine whether the minor was mature enough to consent to medical treatment (therapy for herniated disc). Id. at 748-49. However, the In re E.G.
court failed to specify criteria to evaluate a minor's maturity, thus giving future
courts who confront this issue no guidance.
60. In re E.G., at 111, 549 N.E.2d at 327.
61. Id. at 111, 549 N.E.2d at 327-28.
62. Id. at 111, 549 N.E.2d at 328. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc.,
398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986) (while there is a general right to refuse medical
treatment in appropriate circumstances, the right to refuse treatment in life threatening situations is not absolute).
63. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 111, 549 N.E.2d at 328.
64. When a competent adult refuses medical treatment, he is not necessarily
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the medical profession. The court reasoned that protecting the interests of third parties was the most important consideration." Finally, by concluding that a mature minor may exercise a common
law right to refuse life-saving medical treatment, the court stated
that it would not address the constitutional issue of freedom of
religion. 6
The Illinois Supreme Court correctly analyzed In re E.G. on
common law grounds.6 7 Although the court's approach was accurate,
its holding was incorrect for three reasons. First, the court did not
adequately consider the wide body of case law upholding State intervention where medical treatment is necessary to save a minor's
life. Thus, the court disregarded the State's interest in the preservation of life. 8 Second, although the majority recognized evidence
demonstrating the severity of Ernestine's condition,66 the court's decision contradicted the fact that blood transfusions were clearly in
the minor's best interests. Finally, the court erroneously extended
the mature minor doctrine after failing to recognize the differences
between the abortion cases, where the doctrine has previously been
applied, and the case at hand.
First, the Illinois Supreme Court erroneously ignored the
State's parens patriae70 duty to protect minors 7I and disregarded
committing suicide, since, in doing so, he may not wish to die. Superintendent of
Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 737 n.11, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 n.11 (1977).
65. In re E.G. at 111, 549 N.E.2d at 328. When a patient's refusal of treatment
adversely affects the health and safety of third parties, typically minor children, the
state has an interest in ordering treatment. Matter of Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 352, 486
A.2d 1209, 1225 (1985). A minor may be hurt emotionally (by being abandoned) and
financially if the minor's parent refuses life-saving or life-sustaining medical treatment. Belchertown, 373 Mass. at 744, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
Because Mrs. Denton was in agreement with her daughter that Ernestine refuse
the transfusions, the court did not see any relevance in examining third party interests. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 112, 549 N.E.2d at 328.
66. Id. at 112, 549 N.E.2d at 320. See also In re Application of Roswell, 97 Ill.
2d 434, 440, 454 N.E.2d 997, 999 (1983) (if a case can be decided on other grounds,
constitutional questions should not be considered).
67. See Note, Live or Let Die: Who Decides An Incompetents Fate? In re
Storar and In re Eichner 1982 B.Y.U. L. REv. 387, 390 (where court's decision was

decided on common law grounds, there was no need to extend the constitutional right
of privacy to the refusal of medical treatment issue).
68. The court devoted a significant part of its analysis to discussing Illinois'
strong public policy favoring life. Yet the court did not give even the slightest consideration to this interest in deciding whether minors can refuse life-saving medical
treatment. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 110-11, 549 N.E.2d at 327-28.
69. See supra notes 11, 18 for a discussion of leukemia and the seriousness of
Ernestine's condition prior to receiving blood transfusions.
70. Parens patriae means "parents of the country." The term refers to the
state's sovereign duty to protect minors and incompetents. It is a concept the state
uses to protect its general economy and the health, comfort, and welfare of its citizens. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 579 (5th ed. 1983).
71. Minors are presumed to be incompetent and, thus, need protection from the
State against their own neglectfulness. Mark, The Competent Child's Preferences in
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case law in which courts have intervened to save a minor's life.72
Although there are certain realms of family life the state cannot interfere with, this right is not absolute. 7 The state may interfere
when parental decisions endanger the health and safety of a minor
child.7 4 The majority disregarded the state's interest in protecting
that the right to refuse medthe lives of minors, even after declaring
7
ical treatment is not absolute.
Where a minor's survival is jeopardized by a parent's refusal to
consent to medical treatment on the child's behalf, the state has no
alternative but to intervene as parens patriae7' and order treatCritical Medical Decisions: A Proposal for its Consideration,11 W. ST. U. L. REV. 25,
40 n.96 (1983). One example of a minor's inability to provide consent is the fact that
minors can avoid contracts they enter. Id. at n. 96.
72. See supra note 7 for cases upholding state intervention to save a minor's
life. See also Muhlenberg Hospital v. Patterson, 128 N.J. 498, 320 A.2d 518 (1974)
(where infant would suffer permanent brain damage without blood transfusion, court
ordered such treatment); J.F.K. Hospital v. Heston, 58 N.J. Super. 576, 279 A.2d 670
(1971) (court ordered twenty-two year old accident victim, whose religion forbade
blood transfusions, to submit to such treatment to save her life); Crouse Irving Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Paddock, 127 Misc. 2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1985) (in light
of state's interest in welfare of children, court ordered hospital to administer minor's
blood transfusions over parents' objections); In re Willmann, 24 Ohio App. 3d 191,
493 N.E.2d 1380 (1986) (parents' religious beliefs did not allow them to expose their
sick child to ill health or death).
However, where a minor's condition is not life-threatening, courts are reluctant
to intervene and order treatment. See e.g., Aronson v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. App.
3d 294, 235 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1987) (parents may control minor's medical treatment
unless parents' decisions threatens the child's life); In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127
N.E.2d 820 (1955) (where no present emergency existed for boy with cleft palate and
harelip, court declined to order plastic surgery for the boy); In re Green, 452 Pa. 37,
307 A.2d 279 (1973) (where eighteen year old boy with scoliosis was not in imminent
danger of dying, State did not have sufficient interest in ordering surgery to outweigh
parents' religious beliefs); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942) (court
refused to order amputation of minor's deformed arm over objection of parent).
73. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
74. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972). Parents do not have life and
death authority over their children. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67. The Prince court reinforced this conclusion stating:
The right to practice religion freely does not include the liberty to expose the
community or child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death
...
Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow
they are free in identical circumstances to make martyrs of their children
before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can
make that choice for themselves.
Id. at 166, 170.
75. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d 98, 111, 549 N.E.2d 322 328 (1989).
76. The majority gave inadequate consideration to the State's parens patriae
duty to preserve the lives of minors, as if the interest is inconsequential. Furthermore, the court dismissed cases upholding state intervention to save a minor's life.
See supra notes 7, 71 for a list of cases upholding state intervention. In so doing, the
court completely missed the point of those cases. Admittedly, the issue in those cases
(whether parents can refuse life-saving treatment on behalf of their child) varies
slightly from the issue presented in In re E.G. What matters, though, is that in each
case the State intervened and ordered treatment to save the minor's life.
The Illinois Supreme Court looked at In re Cutsody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733,
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ment." The Illinois Supreme Court has already acknowledged a
strong state interest in protecting a minor from parental decisions
that threaten the minor's health.7 s Therefore, the state certainly has
an interest in protecting the minor from her own decision which not
79
only affects her health, but could result in her death.
The court also disregarded its recent decision in Siemieniec v.
Lutheran General Hospital, in which this court held that there is a
strong public policy preserving the sanctity of human life, even in its
imperfect state.80 The interest in preserving life is even greater when
379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978), for example, where life-saving chemotherapy was ordered to
save a young leukemia patient. The court concluded that since the issue in Minor was
not identical to the case at hand, it could be distinguished. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at
110, 549 N.E.2d at 327. Instead, the Illinois Supreme Court relied on Cardwell v.
Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987), a case even further removed from the present
issue than Minor. In Cardwell, which involved a seventeen year old girl seeking treatment for back pain, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that mature minors can receive medical treatment without parental consent. Cardwell,724 S.W.2d at 749. However, unlike In re E.G., Cardwell clearly did not involve a life-threatening dilemma
and can therefore be distinguished itself. There is a major difference in the consequences of failing to treat a herniated disc and failing to treat a fatal disease such as
leukemia with blood transfusions, where transfusions are the only treatment. In re
E.G., as well as the cases the State cited therein, involved situations where a minor's
life was hanging in the balance. The Illinois Supreme Court disregarded this fact
which distinguishes In re E.G. from every case where a court refused to order medical
treatment for a minor. See supra note 72 for a list of cases where courts have refused
to intervene.
77. In re Willmann, 24 Ohio App. 3d 191, 199, 493 N.E.2d 1380, 1389 (1986).
78. Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital, 117 Ill. 2d 230, 249, 512 N.E.2d
691, 701 (1987).
79. Dr. Yachnin testified that without blood transfusions, Ernestine would die
within a month. Brief for Appellant at 10, In re E.G. a Minor, 133 Ill. 2d 98, 549
N.E.2d 322 (1989).
The State's interest in preserving minors' lives is important not only because of
its parens patriae duty, but also for another reason. The loss of young people, who
represent the hope and future of our society, threatens the progress and stability of
the entire state. Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97, 103 (1952).
The State has a long standing duty to protect its minor residents. In re Custody
of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 754, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1066 (1978). It is not only vital to
America's youth, but to the communities in which they live, that minors be safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into adulthood. Id. The U.S.
Supreme Court further adheres to this principle:
(T]he power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the
scope of its authority over adults. The State has an interest to protect the
welfare of children and to see that they are safeguarded from abuses which
might prevent their growth into free and independent, well-developed men and
citizens.
Prince, 321 U.S. at 170.
80. Siemieniec, 117 Ill. 2d at 249, 512 N.E.2d at 701. The State's interest in life
is just as strong when dealing with patients approaching the end of their lives as it is
with those just beginning life. Longeway, 133 III. 2d 33, 77, 549 N.E.2d 292, 312
(1989) (Clark, J., dissenting). This court in Siemieniec looked to the supreme courts
of Idaho, Kansas, and New Jersey in finding strong public policy favoring life. Siemieniec, at 250-51, 512 N.E.2d at 702. See Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 260, 698
P.2d 325, 322 (1944) (basic to American culture is the belief that life is precious and,
thus, our laws must protect, preserve, and improve human life); Bruggeman v.
Schimke, 239 Kan. 245, 254, 718 P.2d 635, 642 (1986) (a person's life is valuable and
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the patient's condition is curable.8 ' The State's interest was particularly strong in Ernestine's case. Her death was imminent only if she
had not received blood transfusions.8 2 Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court should have concluded that the State's interest in protecting a minor's life outweighed any right to refuse treatment for a
potentially fatal health problem.
The court's second error was its failure to reinstate the trial
court's finding that blood transfusions were in Ernestine's best interests. When a state intervenes to save a minor's life by ordering
medical treatment, the order should not be disturbed by a reviewing
court. 8 In In re E.G., the court failed to consider a number of factors that supported the trial court's decision to order transfusions. 4
First and most importantly, Ernestine was in a life-threatening
situation. Medical testimony established that without blood transfusions, Ernestine would die.8 5 In support, the United States Supreme
Court held that a decision which threatens the life of a minor cannot
86
be justified by religious beliefs alone.
The appellate court also correctly considered Ernestine's willingness to comply with the court imposed treatment,8 7 a factor conspicuously absent from the majority's analysis here. Court ordered
treatment is proper where a patient does not believe that transfusions will hurt her religious standing, as long as she does not personally consent to them. 8 The trial court found that Ernestine would
deserves protection whether he is in perfect health, sick, or disabled); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 430, 404 A.2d 8, 13 (1979) (no life is less precious just because it

suffers some defect).
81.

Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419, 413 n.6 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), cert.

granted, 109 S. Ct 3240 (1989). See, e.g., Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75 N.Y.2d 218, 551
N.E.2d 77, 83 (1990) (when the patient is healthy, the state has a stronger interest in
preserving life, which should override the patient's choice to refuse treatment).
82. See Fosmire, supra note 81 for a discussion of the state's interest in patient
medical care.
83. Willmann, 24 Ohio App. 3d at 199, 493 N.E.2d at 1389. The trial court's
decision must not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Id.
84. The State must consider several factors before ordering medical treatment
for a minor over parental objections. In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 802, 156
Cal Rptr, 48, 51, cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1979). The State must examine the seriousness of the child's condition, whether the medical profession has accepted the proposed treatment, the risks of such treatment, and the minors willingness to comply
with the treatment. Id. The most important consideration is whether the minor's best
interests are furthered by the treatment. Id.
85. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 102, 549 N.E.2d at 323.
86. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234
(1972) (court upheld Amish parents' decision to forego compulsory education on behalf of their child since the decision did not threaten the health of the child).
87. In re E.G., 161 Ill. App. 3d at 780, 515 N.E.2d at 296.
88. United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 753 (D.C. Conn. 1965). Similarly,
in In re Hamilton, a twelve year old girl's father refused to consent to chemotherapy
treatment on her behalf because of his religious beliefs. In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d
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accept the transfusions. This willingness was exemplified by Ernestine's acceptance of nine or ten blood transfusions prior to
testifying."9
When a court examines what is in a minor's best interests, it
must focus on factors unique to that minor's situation.90 Here, since
the court compelled Ernestine to receive the blood transfusions, she
would not be excommunicated from the Jehovah's Witness faith."'
Instead, Ernestine's church would treat her with sympathy. 9' This is
an important factor the Illinois Supreme Court ignored.
Another factor evidencing the correctness of the trial court's order is that no other treatment besides blood transfusions were available to save Ernestine's life.93 Where a minor's life is in danger, judicial, intervention is appropriate unless the proposed treatment is too
dangerous or medical opinions differ.94 At trial, the State presented
uncontradicted evidence showing that blood transfusions are a standard, medically accepted manner of treating Ernestine's disease.
The blood transfusions gave Ernestine an eighty percent chance of
remission, the health risks to her were small,95 and no other treatment could have saved her life. 6 These facts should have convinced
the majority that transfusions were in Ernestine's best interests. Instead, the court improperly disregarded these key factors which the
trial court properly considered.
425 (1983). However, the court ordered treatment, basing its conclusion partly on the
father's "revealing" testimony. Id. at 428. The father said that "if a doctor were to
tell me that he had medicine that would heal me, I'd go right in there just a minute,
but 'there ain't none." Id.
89. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d 98, 103, 549 N.E.2d 322, 324 (1989).
90. Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. at 753, 379 N.E.2d at 1065.
91. In re-E.G., 161 Ill. App. 3d at 781, 515 N.E.2d at 297 (McNanmara, J., dissenting). See supra note 19 for a discussion of the difference between a Jehovah's
Witness voluntarily receiving blood transfusions and receiving them against her will.
92. Joseph Howard, district supervisor for the Jehovah's Witnesses, testified
that if an individual is forced to undergo blood transfusions, the congregation would
treat her with respect and adoration, and would not penalize her. Brief for Petitioner,
supra note 5, at 14-15.
93. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d 98, 102, 549 N.E.2d 322, 323 (1989). See Minor, 375
Mass. at 754, 379 N.E.2d at 1065 (judge determined that there was no affective alternative to chemotherapy in treating a young leukemia patient).
94. Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97, 102 (blood transfusions almost certain to
succeed if given in time and presented no risk to the child). There was no difference
of medical opinion as to Ernestine's condition or the treatment necessary to save her
life. Id. Dr. Yachnin's testimony at trial was uncontradicted. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at
102, 549 N.E.2d at 323.
95. One risk of undergoing blood transfusions is contracting hepatitis, but the
illness can be easily treated. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at 22. Possible side
effects from chemotherapy include nausea, diarrhea, and hair loss. Id. However, these
side effects far outweigh the alternative to refusing treatment, which is death.
96. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 102, 549 N.E.2d at 323. See Minor, at 754, 379
N.E.2d at 1065-66 (there was no chance for a cure without chemotherapy and the
risks were small considering that failure to treat the leukemia would result in the
minor's death).
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Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court erroneously extended the
mature minor doctrine 7 to the present case. The State's interest in
preventing minors from refusing treatment necessary to save their
lives is far greater than in the abortion cases where the concept has
previously been used. 8 The court relied on three U.S. Supreme
Court abortion cases"9 in holding that mature minors can refuse
medical treatment. By expanding the mature minor doctrine to a
medical neglect case involving a seventeen year old leukemia patient, the court failed to recognize the fundamental basis of the
abortion cases.100
In the abortion cases, the Supreme Court focused on the mi97. The "mature minor" doctrine is an exception to the general rule requiring
parental consent. Brown & Truitt, The Right of Minors To Medical Treatment, 28
DE PAUL L. REV. 289, 294 (1979). This exception allows minors to consent to medical
treatment or surgery if it is established that the minor is mature enough to understand the nature and consequences of the treatment. Id. A "mature minor" is one
who is independent, able to manage her own daily and financial affairs, and understands the risks and benefits of proposed treatment. Id.
The Illinois Legislature has defined a mature minor as "a person 16 years of age
or over and under the age of 18 who has demonstrated the ability and capacity to
manage his own affairs and to live wholly or partially independent of his parents or
guardian." Emancipation of Mature Minors Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2203-2
(1989).
98. The State's interest in the abortion cases is to safeguard minors from the
burdensome responsibilities of motherhood, which they may not be able to handle,
and to allow them to make the abortion decision without having to tell their parents.
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 641 (1979).
99. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (abortion ordinance which had no provision for mature or emancipated minors held unconstitutional); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Massachusetts statute requiring
minors to receive parental consent for abortions held unconstitutional); Planned
Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (blanket parental consent
requirement for minors seeking abortions held unconstitutional).
However, in these abortion cases, if a minor is found not to be mature enough to
consent to an abortion, the minor must then show that the abortion is in her best
interests. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 644. See also Wynn v. Scott, 448 F. Supp. 997, 1005
(N.D. Ill. 1978) (State has an interest in showing that minor's consent to an abortion
is an intelligent and mature decision), aff'd, 582 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978).
100. In re E.G., 161 Ill. App. 3d at 777, 515 N.E.2d at 294 (McNamara, J., dissenting). The majority conceded that the rights examined in the abortion cases have
not been extended beyond reproductive matters. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 106-07, 549
N.E.2d at 325-26. Nonetheless, the court felt that these abortion cases did show that
eighteen is not an automatic age restriction limiting the rights of mature minors. Id.
The court disregarded the fact that Illinois has not adopted mature minor legislation in the area of abortion. In fact, section one of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975
demonstrates Illinois' strong public policy favoring the preservation of life. The Act
states:
The General Assembly of the State of Illinois declares . . . the longstanding
policy of this State that the unborn child is a human being from the time of
conception . . Further, to protect the right to life of the unborn child from
conception by prohibiting abortion unless necessary to preserve the life of the
mother is impermissible only because of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-21 (1989).
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nor's best interests in light of the minor's circumstances."' A minor
will face the burdensome responsibilities'0 2 of motherhood if she is
prevented from having an abortion. Therefore, the Supreme Court
determined that extending the mature minor doctrine was proper in
those cases.10 3
However, extending the mature minor doctrine to the present
case is not in the minor's best interests.'0 The two situations are
completely different. Permitting a minor to have an abortion allows
an affirmative act by the minor, and any physical or psychological
harm to the child can be accordingly treated.'0 5 However, allowing a
minor to refuse blood transfusions results in the end of her life. The
majority's expansion of the mature minor doctrine beyond the abortion cases, in effect says that death may sometimes be in the minor's
best interests.
In Justice Ward's dissenting opinion, he clearly identified what
was at stake in this case. Justice Ward determined that this case
was not as simple as one that allows a mature minor to refuse medical treatment. 0 6 The possible self-destruction 10 7 of a young life was
101. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 644.
102. Having to become a mother unwillingly may be particularly stressful for a
minor. Id. at 642. Pregnant teenage girls are often emotionally immature, and lack
education, employment skills, and finances necessary to care for a baby. Id. at 642.
Thus, in the abortion setting, the Supreme Court held that it was wrong to give parents absolute veto power over a minor's abortion decision. Id.
103. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647 (every minor must have the opportunity to go
directly to a court, to establish her maturity, without first consulting her parents
about an abortion).
104. Because the abortion decision is unique, the Supreme Court intended that
the mature minor doctrine be limited to abortion cases. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642.
Deciding to terminate a pregnancy differs in many ways from other decisions minors
may face, such as deciding to marry. Id. A minor who is not allowed to marry before
the age of majority can simply wait until she is old enough. Id. However, a pregnant
minor may only have a few weeks to decide to have an abortion before the law prevents her from doing so. Id.
Furthermore, applying the mature minor doctrine to In re E.G. directly contravenes the Supreme Court's proclamation that the State has a parens patriae duty to
prevent physical and emotional harm to minors. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 169-70 (1943).
105. In re E.G., 161 Ill. App. 3d at 777, 515 N.E.2d at 294 (McNamara, J., dissenting) (the result of preventing a minor from having an abortion is the birth of a
child; a situation the minor can handle with other's help).
106. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 114, 549 N.E.2d at 329 (Ward, J., dissenting).
107. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 447, 497
N.E.2d 626, 643 (1986) (Lynch, J., dissenting). In Brophy, Justice Lynch concluded
that there is no real difference between killing one's self and refusing life-sustaining
medical treatment. Id.
Christians view suicide as sinful, unnatural, and against God's will. Note, The
Refusal of Lifesaving Medical Treatment vs. the State's Interest in the Preservation
of Life: A Clarification of the Interests at Stake, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 85, 104 (1980).
However, although refusing life-saving medical treatment is against Christian morals,
the first amendment does not allow states to enforce religious beliefs. Id.
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the real issue here."' 8 The majority unfortunately lost sight of the
fact that its decision in In re E.G. will have far ranging effects which
go way beyond Ernestine. The court has taken a dangerous step in a
direction that may threaten the lives of other children who will follow. By disregarding an already established State policy preserving
the sanctity of life, the court has weakened Illinois' authority to protect its minors and secure their growth into adults. Remarkably, the
court added to the confusion by failing to adopt a standard in which
"mature" may be measured by future courts. As a result, children
even younger than Ernestine may someday make decisions that ensure their death.
William D. Brewster

108. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 114, 549 N.E.2d at 329 (Ward, J., dissenting). The
majority's unfortunate holding weakens the protection Illinois law has otherwise afforded minors. Id. Perhaps Justice Nolan's closing thoughts in Brophy sum up the
result in In re E.G. as well. Nolan wrote:
Finally, I can think of nothing more degrading to the human person than the
balance which the court has struck today in favor of death against life. It is but
another triumph for the forces of secular humanism which have now succeeded
in imposing their anti-life principles at both ends of life's spectrum.
Brophy, 398 Mass. at 443, 497 N.E.2d at 640 (Nolan, J., dissenting).
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